Lies Achebe told about the civil war, by Gen. Alabi Isama

Since it was first previewed in a foreign newspaper, There Was A Country, Prof. Chinua Achebe’s latest addition to the world of literature, has become an object of intense debate, particularly the allegation of genocide the literary giant levelled against the duo of Gen. Yakubu Gowon and Chief Obafemi Awolowo for their roles in the Nigerian civil war between 1967 and 1970. A veteran of the war, Gen. Alabi Isama, who was one of the commanders of the federal troops during the war, joined the debate in an interview he granted GBENGA ADERANTI, describing Achebe’s account of the war as grossly inadequate, particularly as it relates to the activities of the 3rd Marine Commando (3MCDO) where he led the Sector 3 and also functioned as the Chief of Staff.
Brimming with rage over what he described as the many lies that had been told about the war, Isama said he had initially chosen to keep quiet in order that Nigeria might move forward instead of pondering endlessly over the unfortunate incident. But he said he had decided to break his silence because Achebe’s book is full of inaccuracies.
He is particularly pained that most of the accounts in Achebe’s book were sourced from the third party. He said while he would not talk about the politics of the book, he has a responsibility as one of the war commanders to clarify “certain lies that are contained in the book.” “This book will be out there forever, and I need to defend myself and my actions during the civil war for posterity. Nothing but the truth will be good enough for today and tomorrow,” Isama stated. He began by faulting Achebe’s account of the Asaba Massacre, saying that the incident that occurred at about 10 pm on August 8, 1967 was different from the account in Achebe’s book. He said: “I was the commander of the federal troops of 4th Area Command at Asaba.
The Biafran troops broke the barricade on Niger River Bridge and went straight to a place called Ogbe Hausa at Cable Point area; where the Hausa community lived. “Biafran troops pounced on them and killed many of them. The few that escaped were moved to Onitsha end and they jubilated. Before my troops could reach me to report the situation, about 20 Biafran soldiers had attacked me at Catering Rest House where I was living at the time.
I fought my way through and overpowered the 20 soldiers. I reported the situation to my boss, Major Henry Igboba, at Agbor. “When the tide turned and the federal troops recaptured the Midwestern Region and Asaba, the Hausa people among them retaliated. The Hausa who were there never denied doing that.” On the Calabar massacre, as contained on Page 137 of Achebe ‘s book, Isama said contrary to what Achebe wrote, the Nigerian forces overran Calabar in early 1968 without much resistance and decided to purge the city of its Igbo inhabitants. By the time the Nigerian troops were done, he said, between 1,000 and 2,000 Igbo were killed.
Describing this part of the story as unfortunate, Isama said as at that time, intelligence reports showed that Biafran troops had alienated the Efik people of Calabar. They did not recruit many into the Biafran Army and “had lousily defended the town and the beach area of Atimbo. 3MDCO therefore, led by Col Benjamin Adekunle, had an amphibious landing at Calabar, which was proof that the town and the beaches were not defended by Biafran troops with the seriousness they deserved. Hence, the natives welcomed 3MCDO with all the enthusiasm and the support it deserved. “I landed three days after the amphibious unit landed and the natives gave us all the support we needed—medical, casualty evacuation, food, off loading the ship of our supplies and heavy weapons, “ he said.
He said Achebe’s claim on the same Page 137 that the Nigerian forces opened fire and murdered 14 nurses and the patients in the wards in Uyo could not be true because the federal troops needed all these personnel and there was no way they would have killed them. He said rather than accuse the federal troops of atrocities, the atrocities committed by Biafran troops on the people of Uyo and Annang were legendary. To drive home his point, he showed the reporter some pictures portraying the damages caused by Biafran soldiers among the Annang and the people of Uyo.
He wondered why someone would hold the 3MDCO responsible for crimes committed by Biafran soldiers. Most of the atrocities allegedly committed by the 3MDCO, Isama insisted, were actually perpetrated by Biafran soldiers. He said his observations as an active participant in the war could be corroborated with a book written by Phillip Effiong, a former Biafran general who, apart from being the Chief of Defence Staff of the Biafran Armed Forces was also a Mid-Western Igbo.
According to Effiong in his book, Nigeria and Biafra: My Story (Pages 220 and 221) “… When I visited the Brigade shortly before the invasion, particularly in Uyo and Calabar areas, I received a lot of complaints from the local people about unsavoury treatment by our (Biafran) troops. I drew Colonel Eze’s attention to the complaints and urged him to improve relations with the civilians. “At Uyo, military-civilian relations were so strained that I had to personally intervene to release a local newspaper editor from detention. Such acts on my part were not just a question of feeling alone for my people, but also a question of justice and sense of belonging in an emergent Biafran State. Were these arrests, false accusations, and detentions a sign of things to come in an independent Biafra? These issues bothered me as they would anyone else in my position then….. “… With the fall of Calabar, Itu, Uyo and Ikot Ekpene the rest of the mainland was militarily threatened. Before this threat became imminent, I had strongly suggested junction town, it should be strongly defended.
All he did was to sarcastically remind me that in fact we should also put a battalion at Nnewi. Nnewi was Ojukwu’s home town as Ikot Ekpene was supposed to be mine, because I lived and grew up there. However, I am from Ibiono in Itu, and not Ikot Ekpene. “After I received his sarcastic message, I did not mention the subject again. As it eventually turned out, the fall of Ikot Ekpene hastened the collapse of the Biafran 12th Division and, consequently, of Biafra….” Faulting Achebe’s account on Page 139 of the book where he wrote that on the northern front, Mohammed Shuwa’s First Division easily overran Abakaliki and Afikpo, Isama insisted that he led the troops that captured Afikpo in February 1968.
He said: “As part of my order to clear Biafran troops from South Eastern State and block the international border with Cameroun, after the capture of Ugep, Ediba, Itigidi and Obubra, I decided to have a feel of how fighting would be like in Igbo land. Therefore with 12 BDE commanded by Major Aliyu, we attacked Afikpo. But due to the urgency of Port Harcourt operation, which had to be captured before the Kampala peace conference in May 1968, I was ordered by Adekunle, the 3MDCO Commander, to hand over Afikpo to Ist Division and withdraw my troops to Calabar within seven days. “The capture of Port Harcourt was described on Page 137 of Achebe’s book, that in April 1968, the Nigerians decided to mount a major strategic and tactical offensive designed to cut Biafra off from the sea coast; and that over 40,000 troops of the Third Division, led by Col. Benjamin Adekunle, engaged in an amphibious land and air onslaught on the Niger River Delta City of Port Harcourt. He went on to say that after several weeks of sustained air, land and sea pounding, a period reportedly characterised by military atrocities like rape, looting, outright brigandage – Port Harcourt fell to the Nigerians on May 12, 1968.” Isama agreed with Achebe that the advance to capture Port Harcourt started from Calabar on 17th April 1968, a distance of about 300 miles.
Port Harcourt, he said, had to be captured not later than 30 days. But he said the attack was not led by Adekunle, but he ordered him (Isama) to plan and lead the attack from Calabar to Port Harcourt. He said he did so and captured Port Harcourt in 30 days while Col Adekunle was in Lagos gathering supplies. He recalled that Port Harcourt was captured on May 18 1968 and not May 12, 1968 as contained in Achebe’s book. The general also took an exception to the words ‘rape, looting, and outright bigandry,’ which were used in describing the activities of the soldiers under his sector. He said: “Firstly, you do not rape Efik, Ibibio or Annang women. They were too sophisticated for that.
Ikweres were the best people I had ever lived and worked with in my life.” He also said it was impossible for his troops to embark on such frivolities because he being in command and “with only 30 days to accomplish my task of capturing 300 miles, my troops had no time for nonsense, as they had to cover at least 10 miles per day, including the plan to cross Opobo River. We advanced day and night fighting for every inch of the land. “With our back to the Atlantic Ocean and our chest to Biafran bullets, we had no place to hide loots even if we had time for that. That operation was in the mangrove forest in the rainy season and with rivers overflowing their banks.
Every bit of land was marshy and water logged.” On the capture of Aba on Pages 137 and 138, Achebe wrote that the Third Division slowly marched north, crossing the Imo River towards the market town of Aba. He further wrote that with heavy casualties along the way, Adekunle and his men shot gleefully through a fierce Biafran resistance and took Aba in August and Owerri in September. The Aba offensive, he said, was particularly gruesome.
On Page 138, he wrote that on the Third Division’s entry into Aba, the Nigerian soldiers massacred more than 2,000 civilians. Achebe also wrote about a report written by one Susan Masid of the French Press Agency on the horrifying incident. Faulting this, Isama said: “When we got to Aba, it was a ghost town because Biafran troops had blown bridges and advised the natives to vacate the town.” According to the general, being the Chief of Staff of 3MCDO during the period between 1967 and May 1969, the plans, strategy and the tactics applied by him were directed by Col. Adekunle, the General Officer Commanding the Division. He described Achebe as a story teller, noting that on many pages of his book, he either said ‘the story I heard’ (Page 133), ‘I was told’ (Page 138) or ‘we were told’ (Page 150). On Achebe’s cattle story, Isama said: “In 3MCDO, we had not enough cattle to do that. I am only concerned about the Atlantic sector of the war. The other sectors, if they wish, may defend their honour for posterity. “When Achebe spoke about bombing markets and many more, he forgot the first bombing of the war in Lagos in early 1967 when, despite the fact that the Igbo were killed in their hundreds in the northern part of the country during the unrest at the time, it was Yaba market and Casino, the most populated part of Lagos that the Biafran B-26 bomber came to throw bomb at civilians. Nigeria had no planes to bomb at that time. And in any case, 3MCDO while at Calabar had no planes capable of bombing beyond Uyo and Eket. Not even Ikot–Ekpene or Opobo and beyond.” Isama said whatever starvation was experienced in Biafra was self-induced.
He alleged that during the war, planes and ships, which supposedly carried relief materials, were caught shipping arms into Biafran zone. Not only that, Ojukwu preferred to ship in the so-called relief materials in the night, which the federal troops were uncomfortable with. He believes that what Ojukwu did during the war made things difficult for Biafrans. According to Isama, while the Pope was in one of the countries in East Africa thinking about how to broker peace, Ojukwu allegedly killed some Europeans; a development that made the Pope and other European countries hands-off Biafra’s matter. He said the killing of the Europeans put paid to the food aid the State of Biafra was getting from Europe. He said while Biafran soldiers abandoned refugees and children, the federal troops picked them up anywhere and everywhere. Isama said: “Those that suffered most were children from ages three to five. They were too heavy to be carried about by their parents and too young to walk the distance. The aged, pregnant women and the disabled suffered more. My troops fed once a day at 5pm, in order to have enough for all. “When elders like him (Achebe) talk, we listen. But I say here that his story is inconsistent with the truth. Many words had been used to describe Nigeria’s situation as at today many years after the civil war. Unfortunately, I am not sure if my dear elder feels the same way as I do right now.
Many of the readers of this book never saw or experienced the war. Those who saw it and were really involved, like myself, are over 70 years old, I was only 27 years old then; and on our way now to meet our Maker. Many others are gone. Are we really telling the truth to the next generation on what we did wrong?“ Isama doubted if Achebe meant what he wrote in the book because, according to him, he only succeeded in sowing a seed of discord between the progressive youths across the country.
While Achebe writes about marginalisation and the Igbo not being fully integrated into Nigeria, Isama says there is no way one would discuss these without sounding like a tribalist. He said: “My mother was from Kwara – the backyard of the West or the front yard of the North when it suites those concerned. So also was my father from Kwale area, which also is the back yard of the West or the front yard of the East. I know that I have been detribalised in such a way that I can discuss Nigeria with the truth that the youths deserve with no apology to anybody. “In my opinion, Achebe’s book is tribal and inconsistent with the truth. The Hausa did not deny killing the Igbo. And as Gen. Haruna said at the Oputa Panel in 2001, he had no apology for that. Bringing the 3MCDO into it and Awolowo in a derogatory way is evil and ungodly.” He said contrary to the starvation stories being bandied, the 3MCDO were feeding natives and Biafran soldiers to the extent that the federal troops under his command were feeding once in a day. He also argued that since independence in 1960, the Igbo have always been in the ruling class. In the First Republic, he said, it was NPC/NCNC (Hausa/Igbo); Second Republic, NPN/NPP (Hausa/Igbo); Third Republic, –PDP/PDP (Hausa/Ibo); Fourth Republic, it is PDP majority in the North, in the East and Delta State, again Hausa/Igbo. “So, who is Achebe writing about?” he queried. He said in the Balewa cabinet of 1960, there were 12 Hausa-led NPC ministers and 11 Igbo-led NCNC ministers. The army, the police, the navy, the air force were all from the East. He wondered why the Igbo ran back to the North after the civil war if they were so marginalised. “It is so easy to kill the Igbo because they own the sales of attractive items like cars, electronic items, building materials and others. The Yoruba man in the North or East is a low-lifer.
The man drives a taxi, while the wife sells amala. As soon as there is unrest, the wife puts the cooking pot in the taxi and home they go. “I am sure that we all know the number of Igbo in western states and Lagos compared to the number of Yoruba in eastern states. Let’s get real. If the union of Igbo and Hausa is not working since 1960 till date, then change your direction. You cannot repeat the same thing and get a different result.” He said he had put his war memoirs into print and it would be out soon.