A
former minister of Finance who also served as Secretary to the Federal
Military Government under President Ibrahim Babangida’s regime, Chief
Olu Falae, in this interview with SUNDAY ABORISADE, explains his role in the controversial economic policies during the period among other issues
Kindly explain your roles in the economic policies of the military government when you served as minister of finance
Nigeria was in foreign exchange crisis before President Ibrahim
Babangida took over power in 1985. Nigeria had accumulated a huge
deficit debit on external account arising from import which it could not
pay for. There was no money to pay for the goods we were importing into
Nigeria. This created a problem and our debtors abroad, insisted that
the International Monetary Fund must intervene so that whatever promises
we made would be fulfilled by us with the IMF supervising the
arrangement. That was what necessitated the call for the IMF loan
and the government said it would not take the loan principally because
it will compromise our sovereignty as a nation. The implication was that
our financial policies would be supervised by the IMF and it could mean
that the IMF would bring in somebody who will sit in the Central Bank
of Nigeria and in the Ministry of Finance. That was unacceptable to the
government because it would amount to returning Nigeria to the colonial
status simply because we were debtors. That was how the government
decided to impose on itself, its own drastic measures so as to be able
to pay for the goods without compromising our sovereignty. This was what
we called Structural Adjustment Programme.
The clarification I want to make is that Babangida threw the matter open
for debate on radio and television for weeks in 1985. On December 18,
1985, he ended the debate by making a broadcast that the debate was over
and that it was clear Nigeria did not want to surrender her sovereignty
and that his government had therefore decided to adopt its own SAP- a
self-imposed, belt-tightening measure that would enable us to meet our
obligations to our foreign creditors without surrendering or
compromising our sovereignty.
Did you sell the SAP idea to the Babangida’s government?
I was then the Managing Director of Nigerian Merchant Bank. I retired
from the civil service, five years earlier as permanent secretary. On
January 29, 1986, six weeks after that broadcast, President Babangida
appointed me as Secretary to the Federal Government. These
clarifications are very necessary because many people thought SAP was
brought into the government by me, No! It was introduced and announced
by Babangida on December 18, 1985 when I was not even in government. I
came into government six weeks later. However, being an economist, a
banker and a former director of economic planning for Nigeria and as the
SFG, it was often my duty after cabinet meetings, to announce
the decisions taken and to explain, where necessary and defend the
decisions taken. That was how people saw me as the author of SAP. But
because it was in consonance with what me, as a professional economist
and banker. I had no difficulty in supporting it and explaining it to
the Nigerians.
What was the policy all about?
By importing goods, machine, cars
and champagnes which we could not pay for, we had behaved irresponsibly
and you must not reduce your consumption to pay your debt. To enable us
to earn enough foreign exchange to pay out debt, apart from the fact
that what the oil was bringing was no longer sufficient, we had to
encourage the production and exportation of other items and also,
discourage the importation of non-essentials — that basically was the
kernel of the policy and in implementing it, what was done was to put
the economy in its real perspective. Before then, the public service was
managing the economy and it was dictating the various prices, hence the
distortion. When people have too much power, they abuse it. During the
civil war for instance, the government introduced price control across
the board for cement, beer and newspapers. It was government that
imposed the prices which they must be sold. We just overlooked the cost
of production and just fixed the price in order to please the populace
during the civil war. It was not a sustainable policy. Even after the
war, we continued to implement price control and so when IBB, came and
SAP was introduced, we said, look, we need to end price control. For
example, before the Price Control Board was scrapped, if you sold goods
above the controlled price, you would be arrested and your goods would
be forfeited. We felt that was an oppressive policy. So, SAP ended price
control regime in Nigeria.
Also, before SAP came, the Central Bank of Nigeria fixed the exchange
rates administratively. It determined the rate at which naira would be
exchanged to other foreign currencies; we insisted with SAP that actual
transactions must determine the demand and supply. That was what brought
about the Second Tier Foreign Exchange Market. Let those who want to
buy dollars for the purpose of importing goods into Nigeria for their
manufacturing industries, apply to their banks, so that both the CBN and
the commercial banks would know how much foreign currency was on
demand. They would then look at how much dollar we had earned from oil
and compare it to the manufacturers’ demand. The interaction of the two
would then determine the exchange rate. This is the most realistic,
non-arbitrary way of doing things.
Another price which was being arbitrary fixed was the price of
produce. To be able to pay up our foreign debts without surrendering our
sovereignty, we needed to earn more forex because the marketing board
controlled all produce, and their prices since 1945. What they were
paying to the farmers were below market price, they were below the cost
at which the farmers was producing the items, so what farmers did was to
abandon their plantations. The cocoa, oil palm and rubber plantations
were deserted by the farmers. They went to the towns and became
labourers, messengers and security guards. Their plantations reverted to
bush. The production of cocoa for example, fell from over 200, 000
tonnes to about 80, 000 tonnes. This was because it did not profit
farmers to waste labour and chemicals on their crops only for the
produce to be bought from them at ridiculous prices that did not meet up
with the cost of production.
How did SAP come into this?
We said to be able to export more agricultural produce and earn more
forex, and pay our debts, we must allow our farmers to sell their
produce at any price they could get. Nobody should tell the farmers the
price at which they will sell their farm produce. Let the market
determine the price. It then became necessary to scrap the marketing
board and allow the farmers to sell their produce to whoever pleases
them. Let me take cocoa for instance, before then, the price of cocoa
was about N4, 000 per tonne in 1986 but when the marketing board was
scrapped, it immediately went up to about N50, 000 per tonne and before
we knew what was happening, Nigerian cocoa was being smuggled to Benin
Republic because they were getting higher prices there but the smuggling
stopped because the price in Nigeria became higher than that of Benin.
Instead of using force and arbitrariness to stop smuggling, the
economic forces reversed it. Today, cocoa is sold at N250, 000 per
tonne. Since 1986 till date, most of the villages that were hitherto
deserted, are now a beehive of activities because the farmers returned
when the prices of their produce went up. In those days you could not
find a motorcycle owned by any farmer in the village but today, there is
no village on the way to my farm that you will not have two to three
cars owned by these resident farmers. These are proofs that the SAP
worked positively. The policy worked.
But there was gross abuse of the forex under SAP.
Yes, I agree that there was an abuse of the forex policy. It was the
gross abuse of forex that made people to demand for the scrapping of SAP
without looking at how it had positively affected the farmers who are
the majority. Millions of urban traders and petty traders who were being
victimised and harassed by the price control board were freed and they
are happier today. But because we the elite were the ones who imported
cars and electronics, as the exchange rate went up, they started
screaming and shouting but the silent majority in the rural areas did
not say a word. From 1987 until 1990, the exchange rate did not exceed
N5.50k to one America dollar. I don’t know what happened soon after I
left office; it just went up from N5.50k to N12, to N22 to N36 and on
and on like that. What we suspected was that guidelines were not
enforced and abuses came in. For instance, the method of selling forex
itself promoted the over devaluation of the naira. If a customer needed a
$100,000 in a bank, he would apply for $500,000, hoping that they would
end up giving him $100,000. To that extent, the amount of dollar
requested was artificial. Secondly, CBN would ask the commercial bank to
direct the customer to pay to CBN, the naira equivalent of $500, 000
which he requested for. After the allocation, such a bank may be
allocated $50,000. The naira which had been paid to the CBN after some
time would attract interest and the interest had to be paid for. So,
when the price is being given, it will not be at the regulated exchange
rate, interest rate would be added to the naira equivalent which they
had deposited before the allocation was made. That sharp practices
further devalued the naira.
The other part was round-tripping- there were lots of people who were
not really into importation business but would apply to their banks,
get the dollars at may be, N10.00 to $1. They would send it abroad and
bring it back as black market at the rate of N20 to a dollar. A lot of
people made money through this process. The management or the
administration of the exchange regime, helped devalue the naira due to
corruption.
Why were you unable to check the issue of black market?
Black market was illegal. It was not instituted by anybody. It was
illegal, criminal. Later the bureau de change was introduced to
legitimise the out-of-bank forex dealings. The black market was ruining
the economy as at that time.
What happened in the case of import licence? How was it abused?
People would go to the Ministry of Trade and apply for import
licence. We heard they were paying millions to officials. I learnt that
if you paid N5m for import licence, you would pay additional N5m bribe
to some officials before they give you papers. People spent N10m for
goods of N5m that they wanted to import. When the raw materials were
imported and the goods were produced, the price would be at the rate of
N10m you spent to import it. Those who had no factory at all would
obtain import licence and sell it to manufacturers who would in turn add
it to the price of their products. It was so bad for the economy.
As an active player in Yoruba politics, what happened to Afenifere?
The emergence of the Action Group in Western Nigeria under the late
Chief Obafemi Awolowo put the Yoruba in the limelight and bequeathed
unto us a legacy which focused on welfare from the cradle to the grave
and that is how we had free maternal care for the unborn baby, free
medical service for children, free education, creation of employment,
agricultural development, minimum wage, creation of industrial estates
and so on. Since Awolowo passed on, we have virtually lost that legacy.
People of lesser minds have been ruling us and emphasis has shifted
from the individual to the self. Our leaders are now self-centred.
However when the Alliance for Democracy took over in 1999, based on
Afenifere, the Awolowo legacy, we were hopeful, that once again we would
re-build the structures but unfortunately the governors produced by the
AD did not want to be controlled by Afenifere philosophy. Yoruba did
not know the AD, it was Afenifere they knew and voted for. Afenifere set
up a panel headed by Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi to visit each of the six
states in the South-West and see how they were implementing their
programmes and to see whether they were in accordance with the
philosophy of Afenifere and Awolowo but the governors did not like it at
all and that was the genesis of their problem with the Afenifere. They
then broke away because they felt that we don’t have the right to assess
their performance. Meanwhile, they were not known before they became
governors it was through the Afenifere that they got there. Finally,
former Governor Bola Tinubu led them away to form the Action Congress
with former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar who also broke away from the
PDP. They formed a hybrid that was neither fish nor a fowl.
Do you think that there can still be a united Yoruba?
Ondo State has started it. Afenifere had made a statement with the
recent election in Ondo State. We assessed the policies and programmes
of Governor Olusegun Mimiko under the Labour Party and we were convinced
that they were in line with the principles and philosophies of
Afenifere and Awolowo. The mega schools he built were for the children
of the less privileged, the markets were given to the masses not to the
wives of commissioners as it is happening in other states and the free
medical services were targeted at the masses. We have no problem
supporting him because he is even one of us. We don’t need any sermon
before you know that this man is a progressive. We are sending signals
from here that bribery and thuggery won’t win elections in the
South-West again. Very soon Afenifere will introduce a party which had
won elections in the past and will show the direction. Action Congress
of Nigeria is not Afenifere. Everybody will recognise it as their party
when it is launched. I won’t give details for now but I can assure you
that progressives in the South-West and beyond will soon come together
under the banner of the party.
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